D
ramatic changes are afoot in the Philippines. A wideranging fragmentation is occurring, issuing in an ecclesial pluralism among people who desire unity. Theologies are emerging and fading. The influence of liberation theology, in the form called the Theology of Struggle, is waning. This is significant for the traditional Protestant and Roman Catholic churches, which hope to become churches of the poor. The fragmentation is originating from ferment created by both progressive and populist politics and religion.
The signs of political and ecclesial fragmentation are everywhere. Philippine society, its religious, political, and economic realities, is becoming more complex. In addition, misery is the lot of most. The pluralization of roles, norms, and institutions is confusing and frustrating to a people who cherish a Filipino way of life. Social stresses brought about by the emergence of urban cultural settings and the impact of economic globalization have led to a general fragmentation of institutional networks, both religious and political. They weave together in a blur that has led both the progressives and the populists to assume that the elite are collaborating to corrupt society and misuse their authority for their own gain and not for the improvement of the lives of the people.
The frustration coincides with the failure of politics and with a resurgence of an old pattern of repression. Accompanying this is a turbulent religious climate. Populist sentiments are leading to the restructuring of allegiances, including those of the left, the churches, and the government. The desire for change deepens, but the solutions remain simplistic, utopian, and populist. This is true across religious and political spectrums.
Historical Roots of the Atmosphere of Distrust
The form of the conflict appearing here is reflected in Filipino history. At significant moments in this history the ecclesial and social hierarchies have been identified as arrogant, incompetent, and elitist, while local pastors and church workers have identified with the people. From the beginning, local parish priests learned the languages of the people, protected them from abuse, and took their side against the religious and political hierarchy. This pattern reemerges today.
In the Philippines the local priests and pastors have identified with transformation, while the ecclesial and social hierarchies have defended the status quo. The patron system, still in force today, ensures poverty and misery; this system is the product of the domination of religious and political patrons. The native oligarchy, it is believed, is the result of a native aristocracy formed by the church. In this sense, a practical consequence of ecclesiology is the Filipino experience of misery. However, the local priests and pastors have stood by the poor. They fought against the colonial 
Current Ecclesial and Spiritual Trajectories
In this section we will hold up three streams for reflection: the Theology of Struggle (TOS), the Basic Ecclesial Communities (BECs), and the charismatic movements.
Theology of struggle. We consider first the TOS, which has had two phases. According to the first phase (which I label TOS 1), Christendom is colonialism, because Christian colonialism was the experience of the Filipino. As a spokesman of TOS 1 put it, the finest land became the property of the friars because they controlled the sacraments. 1 This conviction is found in the progressive wings of the Filipino churches. In the early 1970s they proposed a movement intended to transform the Philippines, which also, so it was hoped, could become a unique expression of the worldwide irruption of the poor.
The misery of the Philippines, they argued, could be overcome by renewing the church. This would renew society through the destruction of the system of the elite. The church was to become a witness of a new way of being a people, one made possible by the creation of a new humanity through liberation. Jesus, they argued, is the way. Because Jesus could remain fully human in the face of repression and suffering, he is the model of true humanity. 2 The new human lives a life reflecting true Filipino spiritual and cultural values.
Echoing populist sentiments, the early TOS rejected the traditional Catholic church as the province of the elite. Never should the church run society as the Spanish church did, they stated. It should plant seeds of new life. The church is built through While the ecclesial and social hierarchies have defended the status quo, the local priests and pastors have identified with transformation.
human solidarity (utang na loob) and the spirit of cooperation (bayanihan). The true human is a hero, and the new church will consist of such heroes. They will sacrifice for all Filipinos that they may be freed from elitist and foreign control.
The chief complication of the early TOS was its willingness to converge its interests with that of Filipino Communist movements, which it did from 1972 to 1986 during the regime of Ferdinand Marcos. These movements were, in the end, incompatible with each other. A number of divisions led to a parting of the ways of the Communists and the progressive church leaders. 3 The umbrella organization bridging the gap between the political left and the progressives was the Christians for National Liberation. Unappreciated by the political left, it was devoted to a theology that had social justice, not Maoist revolution, as its goal. From 1972 to 1986 this group was effective. During this period, the New People's Army (NPA, a Maoist guerilla organization of the Communist Party of the Philippines) also achieved its greatest effect, with about 25,000 active soldiers. Today it has only 7,000 members and is shrinking. 4 The early advocates of the TOS also have gone down new paths, often rejected by the new ethnic TOS 2. A split has developed that pits the traditional progressive and ecumenical left of the TOS 1 against the theologically pluralist, antidemocratic, and antiecumenical ethnic theologians of the new generation, the TOS 2, who may have more in common with Asian fascism than with the traditional left.
The waning of the TOS continues to impact Filipino ecclesiological thought. Two issues show this relevance: the problem of poverty and the reality of political failure. First in relevance is the issue of the hoped-for irruption of the poor. It did not happen. Theologians such as Virginia Fabella argued that, with the rise of awareness, the poor would emerge as the new guardians of society. They would take their own lives in hand and liberate society, an idea that generated considerable excitement. Many theologians did and still do believe that a new awareness among the poor will put an end to oppression. In the Philippines, however, the poor did not discover a newfound freedom and solidarity; this dream has not materialized. TOS 1 theologians hoped that the poor would fill the churches with a new spirit. The new movements, however, were those not of the poor but of the charismatics. 5 The other development is political failure and the emergence of populist and charismatic movements. There is a new receptivity to solutions that are populist and religious. Movements aligned with this new receptivity are now exploding. Living conditions, however, have not improved. The most active political movements are ineffectual. Many believe that their insecurity is due to an ossified political system. In recent years the country has experienced one crisis after another. Justice is increasingly absent from everyday life, including for critics of the governing regime. The rule of the elite is in reality a misrule. Almost 900 extrajudicial killings mar the record of the current regime. The Philippines has two long-running civil wars, the war waged by the NPA for Communist revolution and that of the Muslim revolutionary armies for Islamic self-rule in Mindanao. Worry about what this means grows as the seemingly endless strife continues. Election violence is extreme. People are tired of the conditions under which they live. They do not believe the government, nor do they trust that either the elite or the left cares about their suffering.
This conviction is both emotional and rational. Fear and instability have led those participating in populist movements to believe-often from tragic firsthand experience-that current institutions cannot, and have no desire to, defend the interests of the average citizen or member of the church. They view their leaders as arrogant, incompetent, decadent, and corrupt. Oddly, many who fit this category do not seem interested in correcting this impression. They ally themselves with the opposition to the government, even while conveying a bad impression. Civic, ecclesial, and economic leaders misuse funds and openly support mistresses. Progressive groups are also attacked. In the case of the United Church of Christ in the Philippines (UCCP), the lack of trust in the administration of the general secretary's office, accused of being too closely affiliated with the left, has led to dramatic reductions in income.
In general, feelings of distrust are escalating and are being directed toward any organization and its leadership seen as contributing to the status quo. In their public pronouncements, populist religious leaders such as Mike Velarde present the power of the elite as overwhelming. The system cannot be broken; things are so bad that nothing can be done.
Basic ecclesial communities. The Roman Catholic Church is trying to avoid the tug of populism by promoting BECs. One of the chief indications of this directive has been a recent change in seminary curriculum. New designs are being put in place that are aligned with the vision of the BEC to create a church of the poor. This strategy was actually put into action decades ago, at the same time that progressives met to initiate a liberative theology of the poor (TOS 1). The idea is to rebuild the churches from the base
The new movements in the Philippines were not those of the poor but of the charismatics.
up. Implicit is a critique of hierarchical ecclesial order that follows the framework of the 1979 Puebla Conference. 6 This movement was not originally conceived in opposition to the populist and charismatic movements, although in time it became so.
The church is to become a family of God, an image that resonates with Filipino culture. The new focus was on small groups designed for fostering intimate support networks and community building (prayer groups); for encouraging liberative pastoral practices that generate social commitment, not emotionalism or narrow ideological commitments (a critique here of charismatic cell groups and the more radical TOS); and for addressing concretely the local needs of the oppressed. The emotionalism of the new charismatic groups was occasionally referred to as a problem, even an evil.
This was the way the Roman Catholic leadership followed the directive to become a church of the poor. 7 Accepting Leonardo Boff's belief that BECs are a promise realized in history based upon the Gospel, not ideology, they committed themselves to the church, not to political and populist movements. The church is a promise being realized in the journey of the community of those struggling against oppression. Such a church is not utopian. It is not yet in existence, but it is being born through the faith of Christians and the emerging empowerment of the poor in the struggle to overcome their misery. This renewed church arises not among the powerful but among the people, who put themselves in the service of this emerging community.
BECs are to become centers of evangelization. Through their work the people will experience the church as the family of God. Created by the Word of God, their work leads to liberating pastoral practice. The BEC is the nucleus of the renewed church; it is ecclesial. 8 Those groups that are not ecclesial, such as those that tie themselves to charismatic leaders of the left or other charismatic varieties, are not with the program. The BEC is the nucleus of the church, which is the sign and sacrament of salvation.
Each BEC creates a network at the grassroots level that keeps the church in touch with the problems and struggles of everyday living. The poor populate these communities. BECs are the strategy of the bishops whereby the church will share the life and the sufferings of the poor and become a church of the poor. The conflict, touted by populists and the left, between the institutional church and the church of the poor is imaginary.
As one advocate of the BEC movement put it: "As in the Philippines, the problem with society is often not the lack of utopia, but the fact that 'democracy,' 'equality,' 'pagkakaisa at pakikisama' (unity and comradeship) . . . really seriously and courageously have not been tried on a massive scale." The problem is "elite democracy," not democracy per se. BECs are laboratories for transformation of Filipino life. 9 They will bring about the end of elitism. The massive change that is needed to end the suffering begins in the local community church. They have certainly made progress to this effect, with more than 1,700 BEC centers throughout the country.
Despite some success, however, the BEC movement and the UCCP leadership, who attempt to institute a church of the poor, are attacked. Their efforts are viewed as coming from the top down. In addition, pastors and priests involved in community action are often confused with NGOs, to the detriment of their witness. In reaction to the status quo, charismatic groups from within the UCCP have organized a populist renewal movement aimed at creating a new church from within. 10 Charismatic movements. The challenge of the charismatic movements and institutions to nascent Protestant and Roman Catholic ecclesiologies has arisen from competing theologies of spiritual renewal within their own camps. Religion itself is under attack by the faithful, for institutional religion is viewed as an impediment to a spiritual lifestyle.
Adding to the problem, both the progressives and the charismatics attack institutional religion. The progressives reject religion for being in league with the national security regime and therefore in need of repentance. The charismatics critique the institution of the church for not being open to or aware of the work of the Holy Spirit. Both advocate a status flux rather than a status quo, which will reconnect the people to the source of true spirituality. Their understandings of spirituality are dramatically different, although their practices often converge.
The challenge of the charismatic and populist movements is far more nuanced and profound than is often admitted. This is true exactly because it adapts so well to a political populism that advocates egalitarianism. Many Filipinos value this deeply.
They emphasize a message that expressly transcends class conflict. Its authors defend this value in stark and simple terms: the way to overcome the decay of Filipino values is to reject the godless and to recognize that God is the answer to the problems of the country.
A number of distinctive groups offer this message to the people, including El Shaddai, Couples for Christ, and the UCCP Renewal Movement. Other similar groups are the Brotherhood of Businessmen and Professionals, the Loved Flock, and Bukas Loob sa Diyos (lit. "Open in Spirit to God" Covenant Community, a Roman Catholic charismatic movement).
El Shaddai, a Roman Catholic transparochial organization led by Brother Mike Velarde, is one of the largest religious organizations in the Philippines. Velarde's indigenous-styled sermons, which focus on the personal, draw up to a million people to his weekly events. In a manner that consciously mimics American televangelists, Velarde emphasizes that good action leads to good results, a belief that is deeply rooted within Filipino society. His message is straight and simple. To overcome corruption, you must be moral; morality will make you successful in life. The government and the church hierarchy offer Velarde clear examples of immoral leadership, and he is open about his rejection of church leadership. In 2010 he ran for president of the Philippines.
Couples for Christ, led by Father Frank Padilla, is the largest religious organization in the Philippines other than the Roman Catholic Church itself. It is a Roman Catholic charismatic movement that blames the government and the elite for the increase in promiscuity and decay of marriage as an institution in the Philippines. Marriage is under attack, but not by those who would degrade it. Impersonal social forces are attacking it. The values of family and the importance of quality relationships have been forgotten. The model we should follow is that of the early Christian community and its communitarian lifestyle. The premodern Filipino life fostered an intimate relationship with God and within the family. It is now almost gone. We must recover it.
The UCCP Renewal Movement now claims the adherence of many leaders, as well as former sympathizers with the early TOS. This movement is also charismatic. Its themes link political renewal to Christian renewal, which must be effected by rejecting modernist theology that weakens the role of the Holy Spirit in reconciliation. Healing is a very important element of their spiritual practice. To heal the nation, they seek out government leaders for conversion. To heal organizations, they seek out the corrupt and immoral. To heal the lost and immoral, they bring them to public repentance. The movement confronts the leaders of the traditional hierarchy as corrupt and ineffective, as well as ignorant of biblical principles of leadership. Although the movement may have adopted some practices and beliefs from evangelicalism, academic theology is suspect and must be corrected in the church through the spiritual renewal of its leaders, the same renewal that is expected of civic leaders. Communism, especially its Maoist form, is rejected as a threat to the nation because of its anti-Christian and anti-Holy Spirit convictions. In every case, the solution to the misery of Filipino life is conversion to a new way of life. True change results from personal commitment to a purer way of life-one that is Filipino from start to finish. Here the world is permeated with divine their spirituality. Advocates of all the new movements-both Christian and Muslim-hold this view.
Tragically, the unity sought implies a shared spirituality that would bring together the common people, regardless of their religious background. This is of course impossible! Yet some leaders of these movements are trying, including leaders within the left. Some are even advocating theological pluralism in order to establish just this result. Scholars and politicians are setting out to construct Filipino-ness. The way to overcome misery, they say, is to recognize Filipino-ness and to return it to its place at the heart of the people's cultural world.
These new movements are characterized by distrust: distrust of the political system, distrust of the values of the present society (because of supposed distortion by foreign influence), distrust of political and religious bureaucracies, and distrust of economic institutions. The conviction that these distrusts are justified is again both emotional and rational. Its reasoning is simple and persuasive, designed to affirm that current institutions serve only their patrons. Catholic and Protestant leaders-especially Catholics, for historical reasons-are portrayed as corrupt and morally decadent. There are frequent lawsuits seeking redress for financial misconduct. Priests father children. Bishops are accused of having several wives with separate families in different cities. Adding to the distrust is the penchant for both government and church to conduct their decision making in private. Even when the effort has been made to be transparent, the distrust remains. The elite are suspected of protecting their interests alone, of letting people suffer, and of not caring.
In short, the current rise of Filipino populism is both a secular and a religious response to the threats of economic and cultural collapse perceived by the middle classes. The absence of security for both the elite and the middle classes energizes these movements. The perception that the elite are incompetent adds to the appeal. The elite respond by retrenching; the middle class, by becoming spiritual. In this climate, I believe, many have left the poor to suffer without reprieve. Leadership is hemmed in by fear of its own misery.
Unstable lives have led to unstable politics and religion. As mentioned earlier, the solution offered by populist leaders is to provide a framework for stability by recovering shared religious and cultural values in primal religiosity. Both progressive and charismatic Christians are finding sources for renewal and stability by rejecting modern solutions. Simplify explanations, and a simple answer will appear. The problem is that common political and religious agendas are hard to come by, and when they do appear, they can be very dangerous.
Realities of Renewal and Fragmentation
According to recent studies, all but 12 percent of Roman Catholics are currently involved in charismatic practices. Of the Protestants, all but 6 percent are so involved. Of all active Christians in the Philippines, only 10 percent are not participating in charismatic practices at some level. Among charismatic Christians, 90 percent assert that the Philippines needs strong leaders.
14 On paper, the charismatic movements are firmly committed to their traditional churches (with the possible exception of El Shaddai), but in reality, involvement in the formal ecclesial structures is not important. The groups focus on their members-a practice mirroring that of the local parish priests several hundred years ago, when the priests ignored the ruling Catholic orders and stood with their parishioners. Now, however, none of these organizations is under the direct supervision of a priest, and
In the Philippines, spirituality has a political and cultural element from the very beginning.
presence by the belief that the things of this world are not in our hands but in the hands of God. Even for the recent TOS 2, the world is animated by the presence of spirits (anitos)-thus their revival of priestesses. 11 Rejected, often explicitly, is the scientific worldview of the West. Progressive theologians see rational ways of thinking as deceptive for the common people, by leading to a rejection of Filipino culture. Rejected as well are democratic leadership styles, which have no precedent in pre-Christian Filipino culture. Filipino followers of Jose Maria Sison, for example, believe that democracy is a ruse for capitalist control; the charismatics, for their part, tend to abandon the democratic style as a means to ensure their purity. 
Deep-Rooted Religious and Political Populism
In order to understand the appeal of such populist sentiments among Filipinos, we need to study their compatibility with Filipino social and cultural reality. Filipino social discourse widely appeals to communal unity based upon personal relationship and sacrifice. We have already encountered this in the Christology of the TOS. Through unity, class differences purportedly can be transcended, and a sense of belonging can serve as a source for political and social cohesion.
Filipino progressive, charismatic, and populist leaders identify with the common people. All of them argue that the struggle between the classes, the rich and the poor, is rooted in the struggle over Filipino identity. The misery of the Filipino people can be overcome, we hear, only by strengthening the commitment to unity. Here we can see that in the Philippines, spirituality has a political and cultural element from the very beginning. 13 The recovery of identity as a people will supposedly emerge as the common people recover their traditional way of life and deepen they are far more successful than the local priests or ministers in garnering support and facilitating ministries. Fragmentation results.
We are now at a crossroads, where fragmentation is weakening the demands for liberation. What can happen now is unclear. How do we now discern the signs of the times? Can we capture a glimpse of liberation in the maze of ecclesial fragmentation?
The progressives argue that the only way to overcome this humiliating situation is to return to a precolonial culture, in which property and values are shared. The model of the Maoist NPA is village based and intentionally mimics life under the rule of the chiefs of the past, now the local party chiefs. The status quo must give way to a status flux until the humiliation of a lost culture has been redeemed through self-transformation.
The charismatic movements are disenchanted with the status quo as well. They seek to overcome corruption and arrogance through the moral appeal of nationalist virtues and spiritual renewal. Filipinos are a virtuous people who have been corrupted by a spiritually weak elite, the patrons and the imperialists. Both the charismatics and the progressives believe that conversion is necessary. Both appeal as well to anti-intellectual and populist sentiments that devalue education and civil culture. Given that both charismatics and progressives are primarily members of the middle class, it is tempting to say that the middle class is generating fragmentation.
The progressives and the charismatics attack foreign influence and manipulation. Rarely do they attack national leadership but instead direct their aim at trapos (traditional politicians, believed to be corrupt) for letting themselves become corrupted by outsiders. Instead of social analysis, both the progressives and the charismatics use simple ideology energized by dramatic language to create conviction and enthusiasm for the status flux. Drama is the tool of mobilization. Here, whether in the case of the disgraced former president Joseph Estrada or the exiled leader of the NPA Jose Maria Sison, personal charisma is more important than political ideology.
Mass gatherings and protests engender a sense of intimacy between the people and their leaders. Here the middle class is rebelling against the status quo, while the poor are quiet-a point made by many observers of the current scene. The rebels reject the government because of its failure to address the misery of the people, and they reject religion, which is pictured by progressives and populists alike as bureaucratic and collusive with government ineffectiveness. Elites are blamed for the suffering of the "common people." The middle class, supported by its populist religious base, is propagating a Manichaean portrayal of Filipino society that is suspicious of the basic institutional structures of society.
These movements are often hostile to each other in that while they offer solutions based upon an appeal to unity and nostalgia, their understandings of these concepts are so different that there is no possibility of compromise. Those who differ are demonized
The charismatics seek to overcome corruption and arrogance through the moral appeal of nationalist virtues and spiritual renewal.
as spiritually and morally corrupt. The left pictures the past as a Philippines uncorrupted by colonialism and Western values; the charismatics picture their past as a "golden age" when the common people could live simple and moral lives. Yet even at this point their different types of nationalism and populism reflect an affinity rooted in a shared romantic vision of a purer, simpler past.
The problem, though, is endemic. Charismatic and leftist groups and churches have class-heterogeneous cultures. People of different backgrounds and cultural roots do not easily accept shared aims. Conflict, not renewal, seems to lie ahead.
There are surprising signs of renewal, however, especially in the chaos and fragmentation that reign. The persistence of theologies engaged with the needs of the local congregants is inspiring. One thing that is constant is the power of this connection in influencing the direction of the history of the Philippines, not just the church. Church leaders who ignore their local churches will do so at their own peril. They will soon be labeled as ineffective and elitist. The vitality of the local voice is unwavering in the Philippines.
